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From Mother to Child . . A Criminal
Pregnancy: Should Criminalization of the
Prenatal Transfer of AIDS/HIV be the
Next Step in the Battle Against this
Deadly Epidemic?
She wanted to cling to the new life growing inside her, to
feel the baby grow and emerge crying from her body, squinting
and helpless in the light. She wanted to spend days changing
diapers, worrying about the croup, teaching the child to say
'mama.'
But she faced the specter that she would only see this baby
struggle with life and slowly die . . . . Every night a vigil, every
day a crisis.1

I.

Introduction

It has been more than ten years since the United States received
its first official report of the mysterious disease discovered by health
care providers in California, later defined as Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome or AIDS.' In the decade following that report, AIDS and AIDS related illness8 has surpassed heart disease,
cancer, suicide and homicide as one of the leading causes of death in
1.

Susan Peterson, Pregnant Women with AIDS Faced with Moral Dilemma, HARRIS-

BURG PATRIOT-NEWS, Sept. 29, 1991, at A8.

2.

Center for Disease Control, The HIV/AIDS Epidemic: The First Ten Years, 40

MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 357 (June 7, 1991) [hereinafter CDC, June 7, 1991]
(citing Center for Disease Control, Pneumocystis Pneumonia - Los Angeles, 30 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY REP. 250 (July 3, 1981)). For a chronology of the identification of

AIDS, HIV, and related illnesses, see Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F. Supp. 1049
(D.D.C. 1987).
3. See generally United States Dept. of Health & Human Services, FACTS ABOUT
AIDS (1987) [hereinafter FACTS ABOUT AIDS]. AIDS is caused by a virus that is referred to
by several names: Human T-Lymphotropic Virus, type III (HTLV-III); Lymphadenopathy
Associated Virus (LAV); AIDS-Related Retrovirus (ARV); and Human Immunodeficiency
Virus (HIV). These viruses all attack the immune system of the human body. Id. at 3. The
Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic concluded that the
term HIV, or human immunodeficiency virus, more accurately defines the problem and recommended that the focus of any preventative measures should be on HIV infection rather than
later stages of the disease referred to as AIDS or ARC (AIDS Related Complex). REPORT OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE HUMAN IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS EPIDEMIC at XVII

(1988) [hereinafter THE REPORT]. However, for purposes of this comment the terms AIDS,
HIV, and AIDS/HIV will -be used interchangeably because all of these terms are used by both
legislatures and the Center for Disease Control.

97

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

WINTER

1993

the United States.4 What began with a report of a few isolated incidences, affecting only 189 adults in fifteen states, has grown to epidemic proportions threatening the lives of over 200,000 men, women,
and children across the entire country. 5
Recognizing the need to effectuate federal, state, and local efforts to protect the public from the spread of this deadly epidemic,
President Ronald Reagan, in 1987, created The Presidential Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic (hereinafter, The Presidential Commission).' After a year, and more than
forty hearings,7 The Presidential Commission recommended that
"HIV infected individuals who knowingly conduct themselves in
ways that pose significant risk of transmission to others must be held
accountable for their actions."" In response to this call for action, at
least twelve states have enacted legislation criminalizing the transfer
of AIDS or the HIV infection through sexual contact or the transfer
of infected body fluids, blood or tissue.0
Perhaps the most innocent and tragic of all of the victims of this
disease are the children who are born HIV positive. 10 These children
are forced to endure extensive hospitalization and intermittent atten4. Center for Disease Control, Mortality Attributable to HIV Infection/AIDS in the
U.S., 1981-1990, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 1 (Jan. 25, 1991) [hereinafter
CDC, Jan. 25, 1991].
5. Center for Disease Control, The Second 100,000 Cases of A.I.D. Syndrome U.S.
June 1981-Dec. 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 28 (Jan. 17, 1992) (hereinafter CDC, Jan. 17, 19921. In 1981, 76% of the cases reported were discovered in New York
and California. CDC, June 7, 1991, supra note 2. By comparison, in 1990, 2A of the cases
reported occurred outside of those two states. Id. See CDC, June 7, 1991, supra note 2 for a
discussion of the statistics and demographics of the disease.
6. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at V.
7. Id. at XVII.
8. Id. at 130. In 1988, the Presidential Commission concluded that the epidemic "should
be a concern to all Americans . . . as estimates suggest that almost 500,000 Americans will
have died or progressed to later stages of the disease by 1992." Id. at XVII. The Presidential
Commission cautioned that legislation should be carefully drafted to "be directed only toward
behaviors scientifically established as a mode of transmission." Id. at 130.
9. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1991 Supp.); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE ANN. § 1621.5 (West 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 1992 Supp.) (effective
1988); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1992 Supp.); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38 para. 12-16.2 (SmithHurd 1992) (effective 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 (Burns 1992 Supp.); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:43.5 (West 1991 Supp.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(5210) (Callaghan 199293 Supp.); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2927.13 (Baldwin 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
1192.1 (West 1993 Supp.); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.012 (West 1992 Supp.); and VA.
CODE ANN.

§ 32.1-289.2 (Michie 1992).

10. The Center for Disease Control estimates that between 1,500 and 2,000 HIV-infected children are born each year in the United States. PediatricHIV Infection on the Increase, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION (Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga., Special Report,
July 1991) at 2 [hereinafter Pediatric HIV Infection]. Eighty-seven percent of children infected with the disease are born to women infected with or at risk of HIV infection. CDC, Jan.
17, 1992 supra note 5, at 29. See also infra note 31 and accompanying text.
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tion from medical professionals, rather than the love and stimulation
of a constant caregiver, often knowing only a hospital setting as
"home" during their brief lives. 1 Although none of the states that
have enacted AIDS/HIV transmission legislation have specifically
criminalized the prenatal transfer of the disease, it has been suggested that some states have passed statutes sufficiently ambiguous
that such prosecution could be possible.1" This Comment will first
discuss the impact of the AIDS/HIV epidemic and the possible remedies available to a prenatally infected child. Second, this Comment
will explore the possibility that states could prosecute an HIV infected woman who transfers the disease to her unborn child in utero.
Third, this Comment will examine the ultimate battle such prosecution would spark between the rights of the woman, the rights of the
child, and the interest of the state in protecting its citizens from the
spread of this epidemic. Finally, this Comment will address social
policy and enforcement problems and discuss an alternative solution.
II.

Background

A.

The AIDS/HIV Epidemic

As of December 31, 1991, in the United States alone, 206,392
cases of AIDS had been reported to the Center for Disease Control.'" Tragically, of those 206,392 people, less than 36% remain
alive today. 4 The number of reported AIDS cases in the United
States was expected to increase to 365,000 by 1993." Even more
11.

THE REPORT, supra note 3, at 108.
12. Michael Closen & Scott H. Isaacman, Criminally Pregnant: Are Aids-Transmission
Laws Encouraging Abortion?, 76 A.B.A. J. 76 (Dec. 1990). However, it is important to note
that the authors state that OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1192.1 does not consider intent to transmit the
infection as a necessary element of the crime. A careful reading of § .1192.1, however, indicates that it is "unlawful for any person knowing that he or she has Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome . . .and with intent to infect another.. " to engage in conduct that
could transmit the virus. Moreover, the statute was amended in 1991 and now provides an
exception for "in utero transmission of blood or bodily fluids..
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21
§ 1192.1 (West 1993 Supp.) (emphasis added).
13. CDC, Jan. 17, 1992, supra note 5, at 29. The first 100,000 cases were reported by
August of 1989; thus, between September 1989 and December 1991 there were over 100,000
additional new cases reported. Id. In 1991 alone there were 45,506 new cases reported to the
Center for Disease Control, an increase of 5% from 1990. Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome in the U.S. 1991, 41 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY REP. 463 (July
3, 1992). World wide it is estimated that between eight and ten million adults and one million
children are infected with the human immunodeficiency virus. CDC, June 7 1991, supra note
2.
14. CDC, Jan. 17, 1992, supra note 5, at 29. As of December 1991 over 133,232 deaths
(64.5%) had been reported. Id. at 29. Of these deaths, 31,196 were reported to the Center for
Disease Control in 1990 alone. CDC, Jan. 25, 1991, supra note 4.
15. William L. Heyward & James W. Curren, The Epidemiology of AIDS in the U.S.,
259 Sci. AM. 72 (Oct. 1988).
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alarming is the realization that these figures represent only the reported cases, and may not be reflective of the true severity of this
epidemic. 16
The viruses responsible for AIDS 1 7 are usually transmitted
through sexual contact, exposure to infected blood or blood products,
sharing contaminated needles, and from mother to child during the
prenatal period or during breast feeding. 18 After initial exposure to
one of the viruses that leads to AIDS, there is an incubation period
which lasts from six months to seven years, although not everyone
exposed to the disease will develop a "full blown case of it."' 9 The
20
public demand for information about AIDS/HIV remains high,
while concerns over the possibility of transmission in the work
place 2' and health care facilities2 2 continues to increase.
From the first reported case of pediatric AIDS in 1982 until
May, 1991, there were 3,089 cases of children infected with AIDS/
HIV reported to the Center for Disease Control, and it is estimated
that between 1,500-2,000 HIV-infected children are born every
year.23 Transmission from mother to child during the prenatal period
is the most common route of transmission, accounting for 87% of
the cases reported in 1990.24 Sadly, AIDS/HIV has become the
ninth leading cause of death among children between the ages of one
and four.25 More dishearteningly, these innocent victims will die
within only three to nine years of birth, and will be forced to endure
16. The Presidential Commission estimated that between 1-1.5 million people are infected with this virus but are not yet ill enough to realize it. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at
XVII.
17. See supra note 3 for a list of the viruses responsible for AIDS.
18. Heyward & Curren, supra note 15, at 72. See also FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note
3, at 4.
19. FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 3, at 4.
20. Delivering HIV/AIDS Information: CDC's National AIDS Hotlines and National
AIDS Information Clearinghouse,HIV/AIDS PREVENTION (Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Ga., Special Report on Evaluation, February 1991) at 16. The Center for Disease Control reports that the "[d]emand for HIV/AIDS information has been, and continues to be,
greater than that for any other health problem." Id. Calls to the AIDS Hotline average 3,500
a-day, and more than 60,000 reference requests a year. Id. The AIDS Hotline number is I800-342-2437.
21. See Raytheon Co. v. Cal. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 261 Cal. Rptr. 197 (Ct.
App. 1989) (holding that an employer may not discharge an employee solely because he has
tested positive for AIDS.). See generally Walter B. Connolly, Jr., An Employer's Guide to
AIDS in the Workplace, 9 ST. Louis UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 561 (1990).
22. See generally Scott H. Isaacman, The Other Side of the Coin: HIV Infected Health
Care Workers, 9 ST. Louis UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 439 (1990); David Zinman, Health Care
Workers Struggle with Dilemma as Congress Takes a Look at Mandatory Testing, NEwsDAY, Sept. 24, 1991, at 69.
23. Pediatric HIV Infection, supra note 10, at 2.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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extensive hospitalization during their brief lives. 6 These children
will never have a chance to grow up, and many never experience the
pleasures of childhood before they must face the harsh realities of
life and ultimately, death.
B.

The Rights of the Unborn Child

1. Remedies in Tort Law.-What relief is available for these
children? Recently, courts and commentators have increasingly recognized the rights of the unborn child, limiting the liberty of the
mother in order to safeguard the health of the child she carries."
The New Jersey Supreme Court went so far as to declare that "justice requires that the principle be recognized that a child has a legal
28
right to begin life with a sound mind and body."
In support of the right to be born healthy, it has been suggested
that a child deprived of that right and born infected with AIDS/
HIV may find an appropriate remedy in the area of tort law. 29 Pro26. THE REPORT supra note 3, at 12.
27. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (finding that the state's interest in protecting an unborn child may override the mother's interest in'bodily integrity); Jefferson v.
Griffen Spalding County Hosp., 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) (weighing the mother's right to
practice her religion and refuse medical treatment against the child's right to live, the court
held that the child was entitled to the protection of the court); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1985) (appointing a doctor as guardian of an unborn, eighteen week old fetus,
and ordering him to do all that was necessary to save the child's life, including performing a
blood transfusion against the mother's objections). But see Taft v. Taft, 446 N.E.2d 395
(Mass. 1983) (denying an order that would require th6 mother to have an operation to prevent
a miscarriage, finding the circumstances insufficiently compelling to justify violating the
mother's rights). See generally Deborah Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm:
Limits of State Intervention on Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J. OF L. & PUB. POL'Y 19 (1985)
("[Tihere may be circumstances under which a pregnant woman's liberty may be justifiably
limited to prevent harm to her future child."); Jeffrey A. Parness, The Legal Status of the
Unborn After Webster, 95 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1990).
28. Smith v. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497, 503 (1960).
29. Martha M. Curley, Note, EstablishingRelief for the Most Innocent of all AIDS
Victims: Liability for PerinatalTransmission of AIDS, 28 J. FAM. L. 271 (1989-90). See also
Kozup v. Georgetown University, 663 F. Supp. 1048 (D.D.C. 1987) (granting summary judgment to the defendant hospital and blood bank, in an action brought by the parents of an
infant who received AIDS from a blood transfusion at birth, because there was no reason at
the time of the blood transfusion for the defendant's to know that blood transfusions created a
risk of AIDS/HIV transmission, so they acted within the standard of the community). Cf.
Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982) (declaring that the term "minor child" includes an
unborn viable child; And therefore, IDAHO CODE § 5-310, 'which provides that parents may
maintain an action for injury to a minor child, could apply to an unborn viable child); Eich v.
Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354 (Ala. 1974) (holding that the parents of an eight and
one-half month old stillborn fetus are entitled to commence an action for the wrongful death of
the child under ALA. CODE § 6-5-391). See generally C.A.U. v. R.L., 438 N.W.2d 441 (Minn.
App. 1989) (concluding that although Minnesota courts have held that a person can be liable
for transmission of a dangerous, communicable disease, the defendant in this case had no legal
duty to warn his sexual partner that he might be infected with AIDS because it was not
reasonably foreseeable at the time of their relationship that such was the case); David P.
Brigham, Comment, You Never Told Me. . . You Never Asked: Tort Liability for the Sex-
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posing a cause of action for battery or infliction of emotional distress, one commentator reasoned that the doctrine of parent-child
immunity could be defeated by establishing that the act was intentional because the mother knew with substantial certainty that her
conduct would transfer the antibodies to her child.3" However, this
theory fails to recognize that although the antibodies of the mother
are always passively transferred to the child during pregnancy, not
all children who are born to HIV-positive mothers will continue to
carry the antibody eighteen months after birth. In fact, more than
half of these children will not be HIV-positive within two years after
birth.3 1 Consequently, while the mother may know with substantial
certainty that she will pass the AIDS antibody to her unborn child
during pregnancy, she does not necessarily know with substantial
certainty that the child will remain independently HIV positive.
Rather, the odds are in favor of the child growing up healthy.
Nonetheless, it is arguable that the exposure to the virus and
the risk that the child will become infected constitutes the injury.
But there remains an additional barrier to a successful cause of action for battery. Because of the long incubation period of the disease,3 2 it may be difficult to establish the requisite intent.33 The
mother may not have knowledge of her HIV infection during her
pregnancy or at the time of transmission. While a woman who knows
she has AIDS/HIV may have a difficult time convincing a jury that
she did not realize the contagious nature of the disease, a woman
who did not even know she was infected with the virus would have
no reason to know, with substantial certainty, that she was transferring the disease to her unborn child.3 4
A better remedy, therefore, may be found in an action for negligence. 35 If a woman engages in conduct known to transmit AIDS/
HIV, then she arguably should know that she is at risk -of being
infected with the disease. Such a woman may arguably have a duty
to ascertain whether she is infected before engaging in behavior
ual Transmission of AIDS, 91 DicK. L. REV. 529 (1986).
30. Curley, supra note 29, at 274-77.
31. While all babies are born with their mother's antibodies, they later develop their
own antibodies. A clinical study showed that 30% of babies born to women infected with HIV
were also HIV positive 18-24 months after birth. Stephane Blanche, M.D., et.al., A Prospective Study of Infants Born to Women Seropositive for HIV Virus Type 1, 320 N.E. J. MED.
1543, 1645-47 (1989).
32. See FACTS ABOUT AIDS, supra note 3, and text accompanying note 19.
33. See Brigham, supra note 29, at 542.
34. See Curley, supra note 29, at 272-76.
35. Curley, supra note 29, at 284-86. See generally Brigham, supra note 29.
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which could result in pregnancy.3 As one commentator suggests,
a mother has a moral duty not to infect her child with a disease.
Although it is not immoral per se to become pregnant, a mother
who knows or should know that she has AIDS, and knows or
should know that if she becomes pregnant the virus will probably be transmitted
to her child, has a moral duty not to become
3
pregnant.
The question remains, however, whether a court should hold a woman accountable for breaching this moral duty.
2. Legislative Protection of the Unborn.-In addition to court
imposed duties on pregnant women, legislatures have also attempted
to protect the health and safety of the unborn child.38 Two policy
considerations provide support for laws that protect potential human
life: 1) the human being unborn today will be alive tomorrow, and 2)
the unborn child should have an opportunity to live an unimpaired
life.' 9
Perhaps the most publicized legislative measure was enacted in
Missouri,4 and upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Web36. Curley, supra note 29, at 286.
37. Curley, supra note 29, at 284.
38. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1988) (defining murder as the unlawful killing
of a human being or a fetus); CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (imposing a duty on both
parents to provide remedial care for a child, and considering an unborn child to be an existing
person for purposes of this section); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992)
(providing a criminal penalty for homicide of an unborn child); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5
(West 1992) (providing three specific degrees of the crime of feticide); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 1101(4) (West 1993 Supp.) (defining "deprived child" as one in need of special care
because of a physical condition, including the condition of being born dependent on drugs).
See also Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982) (declaring that the term "minor child"
includes an unborn viable child; and therefore, IDAHO CODE § 5-310, which provides that
parents may maintain an action for injury to a minor child, could apply to an unborn viable
child); Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 300 So.2d 354 (Ala. 1974) (holding that the parents of
an eight and one-half month old stillborn fetus are entitled to commence an action for the
wrongful death of the child under tit. 7, § 119 of the 1940 Code of Alabama, currently ALA.
CODE § 6-5-391). See generally Parness, supra note 27.
39. Parness, supra note 38, at 4.
40. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.2 (Vernon's 1992 Supp.) provides that
1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;
(2) Unborn children have protectable interest in life, health, and well
being:
(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests
in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.
2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and
construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the constitution of the United
States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme
Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitutions of
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ster v. Reproductive Health Services."1 The preamble to the Missouri Code declares that
the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to
other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to
the Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court .
Employees of Missouri health care services that offer abortion
services challenged the statute on the ground that it could be used to
regulate abortion.'" The Court explained that the states cannot
adopt one theory of when life begins in order to justify a regulation
of abortion if such a regulation would be invalid under the Court's
previous decision in Roe v. Wade." Refusing to rule on the constitutionality of the Missouri Preamble until the Missouri State courts
interpreted it, the Supreme Court noted that the section simply offers protection to unborn children in tort law and probate law, protections that are not invalid under Roe."5 The Court's decision in
Webster seems to imply that states can decide when life begins in
order to protect the rights of the unborn child, but they cannot prothis
state.
3. As used in this section, the term "unborn children" or "unborn child" shall
include all unborn child [sic] or children or the offspring of human beings from
the moment of conception until birth and at every stage of biological
development.
4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action
against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly
care for herself by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.
41. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
42. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 1.205.2. See supra note 40.
43. Webster, 492 U.S. at 491.
44. 'Id. at 492. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), the Court found the right of
privacy broad enough to include the right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy, without
government regulation, as long as such a decision was made within the first trimester of the
pregnancy. Id. at 163-64. After the first trimester, but prior to viability, a state may regulate
abortion procedures to safeguard the health of the mother. Id. at 164. After viability, however,
the Court found that a state may promote its interest in potential human life by prohibiting all
abortions, except when necessary to protect the mother's life. Id. However, in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey,
- U.S. -,
112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992), a plurality of the Supreme
Court affirmed the "essential holding" of Roe, but rejected the trimester framework for determining at what point a state has a valid interest in regulating abortion. Instead, the plurality
opinion suggested an undue burden standard, "a shorthand for the conclusion that a state
regulation has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman
seeking an abortion of a nonviable fetus. [Such a regulation would be invalid] . . . because the
means chosen by the state to further the interest in potential life must be calculated to inform
the woman's free choice, not hinder it." Id. at 2820.
45. Webster, 492 U.S. at 492.
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hibit an abortion permissible under Roe."' Therefore, legislatures
may be in a better position to protect the health and safety of unborn children.
III.

Legislative Attempts to Battle the Spread of this Epidemic

A. The Need for Criminal Legislation-The Police Power of the
State
The Presidential Commission specifically appealed to state legislatures to join the battle to stop the AIDS/HIV epidemic, urging
them to hold individuals who engage in risky behavior accountable
for their actions.4 7 Commentators have also urged state legislatures
to recognize that "[t]he personal responsibility not to engage in behaviors likely to inflict others imposed on infected persons is not disproportionate to the harm those behaviors would otherwise impose
' Traditional criminal laws may prove to be an ineffecon others." 48
tive and inappropriate means of deterring the type of culpable conduct responsible for transmission of the AIDS virus. 9 Yet, the aims
and goals of HIV transmission legislation are arguably the same as
the aims and goals of the more traditional criminal laws: to punish
individuals who engage in prohibited behavior; deter or prevent danof education
gerous and risky behaviors; and provide a social means
50
regarding the norms of acceptable social behavior.
The Supreme Court has "frequently recognized that individual
states have broad latitude in experimenting with possible solutions to
problems of vital local concerns.1 51 The holding of Lochner v. New
York, 52 in which the Court declared that the state regulation of a
baker's work hours was beyond the scope of the police power, 53 has
46. See supra note 44.
47. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at 130. Risky behaviors are those that are known to be
responsible for the transmission of the virus.
48. Donald H. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST.
Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 351, 356 (1990). See also David Robinson, Jr., Aids and the Criminal
Law: Traditional Approaches and a New Statutory Proposal, 14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 91 (1985);
Sallyanne K. Sullivan & Max C. Feldman, Imposing Criminal Liability on Those who Knowingly Transmit the AIDS Virus: A Recommendationfor Legislative Action, 13 U. DAYTON L.
REV. 489 (1988).
49. Hermann, supra note 48, at 352. See also State v. Sherouse, 536 So.2d 1194 (Fla.
App. 1989) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss manslaughter charges after she offered to
have sexual intercourse in exchange for money, knowing she was infected with HIV and failing
to inform the man of her condition, because there was no evidence establishing a criminal
intent to kill).
50. Hermann, supra note 48, at 352.
51. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977).
52. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
53. Id. at 57. The Court stated:
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been rejected many times. 54 The police power of the state has been
upheld to protect children from exploitation, 5 and to protect the
public health from the threat of tuberculosis5 6 and venereal
diseases.
Public policy demands that the rights of individuals must bend
to the greater concerns of the general public when a deadly and
costly disease threatens society. 58 In addition to the great financial
burden created by the AIDS/HIV epidemic, the economy of the
United States is being crippled by the decrease in the productivity of
many people during their prime earning years. 59 Additionally, when
a child is born to a mother and father who will not be alive to provide the necessary care and support, 60 the child will become the financial responsibility of the taxpaying public.6" As one commentator
suggested, while lawmakers are limited in what they are able to do
to halt the spread of this disease, the seriousness of its consequences
compels them to do what they can.62 "If the threat of criminal liabilThere is no reasonable ground for interfering with the liberty of person [sic]
or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor in the occupation
of a baker . . . . [W]e think that a law like the one before us involves neither
the safety, the morals nor the welfare of the public, and that the interest of the
public is not in the slightest degree affected by such an act.
Id.
54. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597. See, for example, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117 (1973);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481-82 (1965).
55. State v. Davis, 768 P.2d 499 (Wash. App. 1989) (holding a state law prohibiting
possession of child. pornography to be a valid invasion of privacy).
56. In re Halko, 246 Cal. App.2d 553, 54 Cal. Rptr. 661 (1966) (allowing a quarantine
for tuberculosis); Moore v. Draper, 57 So.2d 648 (Fla. 1952) (allowing quarantine in prison
for tuberculosis).
57. People v. Johnson, 181 Cal. App.3d 1137, 225 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1986) (affirming an
enhanced sentence for a convicted rapist who infected his victim with herpes); In re Johnson,
180 P. 644 (1919) (allowing a quarantine for venereal disease).
58. Sallyanne K. Sullivan & Max C. Feldman, supra note 48, at 498. The Presidential
Commission predicted that nationwide medical costs for people with AIDS is projected to
increase from $1.1 billion in 1985 to $8.5 billion by the end of 1991. THE REPORT, supra note
3, at 142. The total cost to the country for lost income, decreased compensation, insurance
payouts, and personal care was expected to increase from $8.7 billion in 1986 to $66.5 billion
by the end of 1991. Id.
59. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at 142.
60. The Center for Disease Control estimates that during the 1990's, mothers or both
parents of more than 10 million children will die from HIV infection. CDC, June 7, 1991,
supra note 2. The Presidential Commission discovered that urban hospitals report an increasing number of children who must remain in the hospital when no medical care is required
because there is nobody to care for them. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at 108.
61. It is estimated that 20% of AIDS victims are uninsured, and 40% of AIDS victims
rely on medicaid. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at 145. The Presidential Commission recommended that an elaborate and comprehensive system of foster care supervised by specially
trained case workers be implemented to provide for these infected children. Id. at 109. Funding for these programs should be made available from the Department of Human Services and
the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. at 109-110.
62. Sullivan & Feldman, supra note 48, at 506-07.
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ity elevates the consciousness of those capable of harming others
through transmission of the virus, so that they forego dangerous activity, then the law will have achieved its goal." 6 3
The Current Legislation-Could it be Used to Prosecute a Woman
for Prenatal Transmission?
Many states have heeded the call for action by enacting criminal statutes prohibiting certain behaviors that transmit the AIDS virus, and providing criminal penalties for those who disobey the law. "
While some states have provided criminal liability only for the donation or sale of blood or other bodily fluids,6 5 others protect against
transmission through sexual contact. 6 Texas and Oklahoma specifically provide an exception from criminal liability for in utero transmission." However, at least four states have drafted legislation that
is ambiguous enough that it could be used to prosecute an infected
woman who transfers the disease to her child during the prenatal
transfer of blood and blood products.6 8
An Illinois statute6 9 in particular, has received both praise and
63. Id. at 508-09.
64. See statutes cited supra note 9.
65. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 1621.5 (West 1990); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 2927.13 (Baldwins 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.2 (Michie 1992 Supp.).
66. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 384.24 (West 1992 Supp.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 43.5 (West
1991 Supp.); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.15(5210) (Callaghan 1992-93 Supp.).
67. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21 § 1192.1 (Michie 1993 Supp.); TEXAS PENAL CODE ANN.
§ 22.012 (West 1992 Supp.).
68. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1991 Supp.); IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1992
Supp.) (enacted in 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992 Supp.) (effective Sept. 11, 1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 (Burns 1992 Supp.) (enacted 1988).
69. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2 (Smith-Hurd 1992 Supp.) provides:
12-16.2 Criminal Transmission of HIV. (a) A person commits criminal transmission of HIV when he or she, knowing that he or she is infected with HIV;
(1) engages in intimate contact with another;
(2) transfers, donates, or provides his or her blood, tissue, semen, organs,
or other potentially infectious body fluids for transfusion, transplantation, insemination, or other administration to another; or
(3) dispenses, delivers, exchanges, sells, or in any other way transfers to
another any nonsterile intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia.
(b) For purposes of this section:
"HIV" means the human immunodeficiency virus or any other identified
causative agent of acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.
"Intimate contact with another" means the exposure of the body of one
person to the bodily fluid of another person in a manner that could result
in the transmission of HIV.
"Intravenous or intramuscular drug paraphernalia" means any equipment, product, or material of any kind which is peculiar to and marketed
for use in injecting a substance into the human body.
(c) Nothing in this Section shall be construed to require that an infection with
HIV has occurred in order for a person to have committed criminal transmission
of HIV.
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criticism.70 Opponents seeking the repeal of this statute claim that a
woman in Illinois who knows she is infected and becomes pregnant
could be prosecuted under this section. 71 Indeed, the language of the
statute does encompass the intimate contact and transfer of bodily
fluids between mother and child that occurs during pregnancy.

Under the statute, "[a] person commits criminal transmission of
HIV when he or she knowing that he or she is infected with HIV,
engages in intimate contact with another . . . [or] provides his'or
her blood, . . . or other potentially infectious bodily fluids for . . .
administration to another. 17 2 The definition of intimate contact, "the
exposure of the body of one person to the bodily fluid of another
person in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV," 73
arguably applies to the prenatal transfer of fluids from mother to
child. Moreover, the statute does not require that actual infection
occur.7 4 Even if the child is one of the 70% who do not test positive
for the AIDS antibody eighteen months after birth 7 5 the woman
could still be prosecuted for, the transmission that occurred during
the prenatal period.
Similarly, an Indiana statute 76 provides that a woman who
(d) It shall be an affirmative defense that the person exposed knew that the
infected person was infected with HIV, knew that the action could result in infection with HIV, and consented to the action with that knowledge.
(e) A person who commits criminal transmission of HIV commits a Class 2
felony.
(emphasis added).
70. See Michael Closen & Jeffrey Deutschman, Proposal to Repeal the Illinois HIV
Transmission Statute, 78 ILL. B.J. 592 (1990) (criticizing the statute as overly broad, vague,
and unconstitutional). But see Hermann, supra note 48 (calling the Illinois statute a "model
HIV specific crime offense"). In April, 1991, a prostitute in Madison County, Illinois was
charged with attempted criminal transmission of HIV, under this section, when she solicited
an undercover policeman, knowing that she was infected with the virus. Prostitute with AIDS
Will Stay in Custody, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, April 26, 1991, at C12.
71. Closen & Deutschman, supra note 70, at 592-93. Interestingly, the authors of this
article also suggest that a person who cries in a swimming pool or shakes sweaty hands with
another person could also be prosecuted, despite the fact that those situations may not involve
any real threat of transmission. Id.
72. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(a)(l)-(2). See supra note 69.
73. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(b). See supra note 69.
74. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 12-16.2(c). See supra note 69.
75. See supra note 31.
76. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7 (Burns 1992 Supp.) provides:
Transferring contaminated body fluids.-(a) As used in this section, "component" means plasma, platelets, or serum of a human being.
(b) A person who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally donates, sells, or
transfers blood, blood component, or semen for artificial insemination (as defined
in IC 16-8-7.5) that contains the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) commits
transferring contaminated body fluids, a Class C felony.
(c) However, the offense is a Class A felony if it results in the transmission
of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) to any person other than the
defendant.
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"knowingly, or intentionally . . . transfers blood . . .that contains

the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) commits transferring contaminated body fluids, a Class C felony."' 7 7 Even if the child does not
test positive for HIV infection after birth, the woman who knows she
is HIV positive and becomes pregnant could nonetheless be guilty of
transferring contaminated body fluids. Furthermore, if the child does
test positive for HIV infection, the woman could be guilty of a Class
A felony. 78 It is questionable, however, whether a woman "intentionally . . .transfers blood" to her child during pregnancy if she did
not intend to become pregnant. Moreover, the threat of this type of
prosecution could force the woman to terminate her pregnancy to
avoid knowingly transferring contaminated blood or body fluid. 9 If
the woman does not discover that she is HIV positive until after her
pregnancy has progressed beyond the time in which abortion is legal
or safe, she may be left with no option but to violate the law or risk
her own safety.
In comparison, a person in Arkansas who has AIDS or who has
tested positive for HIV infection and practices certain behaviors is
considered a "danger to the public." 80 Accordingly, under the Arkansas statute, a person who "knows he or she has tested positive for
(d) This section does not apply to:
(1)A person who, for reasons of privacy, donates, sells or transfers
blood or blood component at a blood center (as defined in IC 16-8-7-1)
after the person has notified the blood center that the blood or blood component must be disposed of and may not be used for any purpose; or
(2) A person who transfers blood, a blood component, semen, or another body fluid that contains the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)
for research purposes.
77. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(b). See supra note 76.
78. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-7(c). See supra note 76.
79. See Arlene Zarembka & Katherine M. Franke, Women in the AIDS epidemic: A
Portrait of Unmet Needs, 9 ST. Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 519, 524 (1990); see also Closen &
Issacman, supra note 12, at 77.
80. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123 (Michie 1991 Supp.) provides:
(a) A person with Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS) or who
tests positive for the presence of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) antigen
or antibodies is infectious to others through the exchange of body fluids during
sexual intercourse and through the parenteral transfer of blood and blood products and under these circumstances is a danger to the public.
(b) A person commits the offense of exposing another to HIV if the person
knows he or she has tested positive for HIV and exposes another person to such
viral infection through the parenteral transfer of blood or blood products or engages in sexual penetration with another person without first having informed
the other person of the presence of HIV.
(c) As used in this section, "sexual penetration" means sexual intercourse,
cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other intrusion, however, slight, of
any part of a person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of
another person's body, but emission of semen is not required.
(d) Exposing another to HIV is a Class A felony.
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HIV and exposes another person to such viral infection through the
parenteral transfer of blood or blood products . . ." has committed a
felony.8 Because the section does not further explain the scope of
"parenteral transfer of blood," it is possible that the prenatal trans82
fer from mother to child could satisfy this definition.

The term "parenteral" refers to the entrance of a substance into
the body "by some other means than through the gastrointestinal

tract; referring particularly to the introduction of substances into an
organism by intravenous, subcutaneous, intramuscular, or intramedullary injection." 83 Because the mother's body provides nourishment
to the child through the placenta, an "organ of metabolic interchange between the fetus and mother . . . . [permitting] the absorption of nutritive materials, oxygen, and some harmful sub-

stances, like viruses, into the fetal blood

.

"..-4

this process is

arguably a parenteral transfer.
On the other hand, because it may be difficult to determine the
route by which the virus entered the child's body, the transfer may
not be considered parenteral. 83 Specifically, if the child became infected during the trauma of birth, then depending upon whether the
infection entered the child's body through an abrasion to the skin
(subcutaneous) or through the mouth (digestive tract), the transfer
may or may not be a parenteral one. 8
Finally, prosecution could be possible under an Idaho statute87
81. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-123(b). See supra note 80.
82. Closen & Isaacman, supra note 12, at 77.
83. STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1139-40 (Williams & Wilkins, 25th ed. 1990).
"Intravenous" is defined as through the veins, "intramuscular" as through the muscles, and
"intramedullary" as within bone marrow or the spinal cord. Id. at 796. "Subcutaneous" is
defined as under the skin. Id. at 1493. "Gastrointestinal" is defined as "referring to the stomach and intestines." Id. at 636.
84. Id. at 1205. The definition of placenta provides that "...
no direct mixing of fetal
and maternal blood occurs, but the intervening tissue (the placental membrane) is sufficiently
thin to permit the absorption of nutritive materials, oxygen, and some harmful substances, like
viruses, into the fetal blood .
"d.
I...
85. Telephone interview with Blake L. Powell, M.D., J.D., Emergency Medicine Physician at Harrisburg Hospital, Harrisburg, PA, certified by the American Board of Emergency
Medicine (A.B.E.M.), and an adjunct instructor at The Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle,
PA, (Nov. 17, 1991).
86. Id. Dr. Powell pointed out that if the child were to become infected during the
trauma of birth it would be necessary to determine the manner in which the infection entered
the child's body before concluding whether the transfer was a parenteral one. If the infection
entered under the skin (subcutaneous), as the result of an injury during birth, then this could
be considered within the definition of parenteral. However, if the child swallowed infected
blood and the blood traveled from the mouth into the digestive tract of the child, this transfer
would be outside the definition of parenteral. Id.
87. IDAHO CODE § 39-608 (1992 Supp.) provides:
(1) Any person who exposes another in any manner with the intent or, knowing
that he or she is or has been afflicted with acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
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which provides that a woman who knows she is infected with HIV
and "transfers . . . her body fluid . . . to another person is guilty of
a felony . ... "88 Idaho does provide an exception for a person who
transfers such fluids after being advised by a physician that he or she
is noninfectious. 89 This exception may not protect a woman who discovers she is infected after she has begun her pregnancy.
IV.
A.

Analysis
Constitutional Challenges

1. The Right to Privacy and The Right to Procreate.-Any law
that criminalizes the transfer of a disease through the prenatal transfer of blood, thereby burdening the choice of whether to conceive a
child, will undoubtedly be met with cries of constitutional violation.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the right
to choose whether to bear a child is a fundamental right. 90 As the
(AIDS), AIDS related complexes (ARC), or other manifestations of human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) infection, transfers or attempts to transfer any of
his or her body fluid, body tissue or organs to another person is guilty of a felony
and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period not to
exceed fifteen (15) years, by fine not in excess of five thousand dollars ($5,000),
or by both such imprisonment and fine.
(2) Definitions. As used in this section:
(a) "Body fluid" means semen (irrespective of the presence of spermatozoa), blood, saliva, vaginal secretin, breast milk, and urine.
(b) "Transfer" means engaging in sexual activity by genital-genital contact, oral-genital contact, anal-genital contact; or permitting the use of a
hypodermic syringe, needle, or similar device without sterilization; or giving, whether or not for value, blood, semen, body tissue, or organs to a
person, blood bank, hospital, or other medical care facility for purposes of
transfer to another person.
(3) Defenses:
(a) Consent. It is an affirmative defense that the sexual activity took
place between consenting adults after full disclosure by the accused of the
risk of such activity.
(b) Medical Advice. It is an affirmative defense that the transfer of body
fluid, body tissue, or organs occurred after advice from a licensed physician that the accused was noninfectious."
88. IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1). See supra note 87.
89. IDAHO CODE § 39-608(1).
90. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687 (1977) (declaring a law that
restricted availability of hazardous as well as nonhazardous contraceptives unconstitutionally
broad); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (holding that unmarried persons could
not be restricted from access to contraception); Griswold .v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485
(1965) (holding that a couple's right to choose whether or not to use birth control falls "within
the zone of privacy protected by several fundamental constitutional guarantees"); and, Skinner
v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that a statute providing for the sterilization
of "habitual criminals" violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
court noted that "[w]e are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil
rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race.").
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Court declared in Eisenstadt v. Baird,91 "if the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusions into matters so
fundamentally affecting9 2 a person as the decision whether or not to
bear or beget a child.
However, a regulation that restricts or burdens a fundamental
right is not necessarily unconstitutional. In Roe v. Wade, 93 the Court
held that the right of privacy with respect to one's body was broad
enough to cover the right to choose whether to terminate a pregnancy.9 4 However, the Court qualified the privacy right involved as
one that is not absolute, and one that in the past, the Court refused
95
to recognize as unlimited.
As recognized in Roe, when a fundamental right is involved, a
two-pronged, strict scrutiny test must be employed to determine the
validity of the law in question.96 If a state began prosecuting HIV
infected women who transfer their infection to their children through
the prenatal transfer of blood and blood products, the state would
have to demonstrate that: 1) its regulation is justified by a sufficiently compelling state interest; and 2) the regulation is narrow
enough in scope so as not to extend beyond the boundaries of that
legitimate interest.9"
Under strict scrutiny, a regulation criminalizing the transfer of
AIDS/HIV through prenatal transmission would probably meet the
first prong of the test. As the Court cautioned in Carey v. Population Services International," "even a burdensome regulation may be
91.

405 U.S. 438 (1972).

92. Id. at 453.
93. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
94. Id. at 154.
95. Id. at 154. The Court cited with approval, Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11
(1905) in which compulsory vaccination to control an epidemic was upheld; and Buck v. Bell,
274 U.S. 200 (1927) in which the Court permitted the sterilization of institutionalized mental
incompetents.
96. 410 U.S. at 155. For a discussion of the different levels of scrutiny that the Supreme
Court has applied, see generally The Supreme Court, 84 Term, 99 HARv. L. REv. 4, 161
(1985). Under a strict scrutiny test, the state must prove a compelling interest in regulating a
particular behavior. Under intermediate level scrutiny, however, the state must only show an
important interest, while under a minimum level scrutiny tests, the state need only demonstrate a rational basis between the regulation and a legitimate state interest. Id. at 161, n.1.
97. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 686-88, and Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 485. It has been suggested that any effort to regulate or control the transmission of AIDS/
HIV may consequently infringe on the rights of those who are infected or who are members of
a high risk group. Thus, when such measures are challenged on constitutional grounds, the
regulation should be evaluated in terms of the state's purpose or objective, and the relationship
between that purpose and the means employed to achieve it. The Constitutional Rights of
Aids Carriers, 99 HARv. L. REV. 1274 (1986).
98. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
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validated by a sufficiently compelling state interest." 99 It would be
difficult to argue that a state does not have a compelling interest in
protecting its citizens from the spread of this deadly epidemic.
As the Court recognized in Roe, "a pregnant woman cannot be
isolated in her privacy" while she carries a developing human being
in her uterus; and therefore the situation is inherently different from
the issues of marital intimacy, procreative freedom, or the right to
use contraception addressed in prior cases.1 0 Because of this difference, the Court in Roe noted that it would be "reasonable and appropriate for a [s]tate to decide that at some point in time another
interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life,
becomes significantly involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole
and any right of privacy she possesses must be measured
accordingly."'' 0 1
In Roe, the critical point in time was at the end of the first
trimester of pregnancy, when the risk to the mother during abortion
was significantly increased, and the state's interest in protecting the
health of the mother became sufficiently compelling to justify regulation. 102 In the present situation, the point in time when the state's
interest would arguably become compelling is at the moment the infected woman conceives and a potential life becomes involved. The
Court has noted
that a legitimate state interest in this area need not stand or fall
on acceptance of the belief that life begins at conception .. .
recognition may be given to the less rigid claim that as long as
at least potential life is involved, the [s]tate may assert interests
beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone.'0
The right to choose whether to bear a child cannot be free from
governmental intrusion when such a choice affects the health and
safety of the public as well as the right of a child to be born
healthy.10 4 Thus, the compelling interest requirement would be met
and the analysis must move to an examination of the restrictiveness
of the regulation.
This second prong of the strict scrutiny test may also be satisfied. In Roe, the Court determined that the Texas statute criminaliz99. Id. at 686.
100. 410 U.S. at 159. The Court distinguished Roe from Eisenstadt, Griswald, and
Skinner.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 163.
103. Roe, 410 U.S. at 150 (emphasis original).
104. See supra notes 8, 13 & 27 and accompanying text.
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ing abortion at any time during the pregnancy was overly broad because the interest of the State of Texas was not compelling until
after the first trimester.'
Similarly, the Court in Carey held that
the New York Education Law, prohibiting anyone other than a licensed pharmacist from distributing contraceptives, was unconstitutional.""6 The Court reasoned that because the restriction of the nonhazardous contraceptives was not related to the state's interest in
protecting health or potential life, the law which restricted both haz107
ardous and non-hazardous contraceptives was overly broad.
The possible use of the criminal law examined in this Comment
presents a situation distinguishable from Roe and Carey. The legitimate interest in this case is to prevent the spread of the AIDS epidemic by criminalizing the behaviors responsible for spreading the
disease. Unlike the laws examined in Roe and Carey, this type of
regulation would not extend beyond the boundaries of the legitimate
state interest. Such a measure represents the least restrictive alternative available to the state. It is certainly better to place the responsibility on infected individuals to refrain from behavior that is responsible for transmitting the virus than to quarantine or isolate those
individuals altogether. 0 8
Moreover, any argument that such a law would attempt to
criminalize the status of being a victim of this illness, or being a
member of a high risk group,10 9 would fail for several reasons. First,
unlike the statute invalidated in Robinson v. California,"0 which
made it a crime to be a heroin addict, a law criminalizing the transfer of the HIV infection through the prenatal transfer of blood and
blood products would not punish a woman for being HIV infected.
Rather, it would only punish infected individuals who engage in spe105. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
106. Carey, 431 U.S. at 689-91.
107. Id.
108. See The Constitutional Rights of Aids Carriers,supra note 97. The author suggests that quarantine of all AIDS carriers would be an overly oppressive measure and enforcement against only dangerous individuals might prove difficult.
Determinations would necessarily be based on predictions of future behavior that
either could not be substantiated, or could not be made with sufficient certainty
to meet the test of close fit and least restrictive means; an individual could face
indefinite confinement simply because of assumptions about what he [she] might
do in the future . . . . Under such a regulation, an individual who did not commit a crime could be involuntarily confined and permanently stigmatized without
receiving the safeguards of a criminal trial.
Id. at 1283-84.
109. Those people considered members of a "high-risk group" are individuals who have
engaged in the behaviors that are known to transmit the infection, regardless if they have
tested positive yet. See Heyward & Curran, supra note 15.
110. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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cifically prohibited conduct. A woman who suffers from AIDS would
not be punished simply because she was ill; but rather, she would be
prosecuted only when she engaged in the specific prohibited conduct
of passing the disease to her unborn child through the prenatal
transmission of blood and blood products.
Second, as Justice Douglas explained in his concurring opinion
in Robinson, those who suffer from addictions or illnesses can be
subject to punitive measures, but only when those measures are related to behaviors that transgress beyond acceptable standards.1 1' A
woman suffering from AIDS/HIV, or a woman who is knowingly a
member of a high-risk group, would not be subjected to criminal
prosecution unless she engages in behavior that transgresses beyond
acceptable standards.
A woman who knows or has reason to know that she is HIV
positive may arguably be considered to have engaged in behavior
that transgresses beyond permissible or acceptable standards when
she passes the infection to her unborn child in utero. But this argument fails to consider the problem presented when the woman claims
to have unsuccessfully tried to prevent conception, and therefore she
did not intend to become pregnant or engage in prohibited behavior.
Of course, the need to prove intent could be eliminated by the imposition of strict liability. 1 2 However, an HIV infected woman who
utilizes birth control might still be prosecuted for something over
which she has no control because contraceptive measures do not always prevent pregnancy." 3 Nonetheless, pregnancy results from the
act of engaging in consensual sexual intercourse; conduct that is voluntary." 4 Because the AIDS/HIV epidemic presents such a serious
public threat, a state may be able to impose a duty on a woman to
Ill.

Id. at 674 (Douglas, J., concurring).
112. See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota, 218 U.S. 57, 69-70 (1910) (holding that
in prohibition of certain acts, in order to protect the public, a state may provide that "he who
shall do them shall do them at his peril and will not be heard to plead in defense good faith or
ignorance"). See also United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922) "[W]here one deals with
others and his mere negligence may be dangerous to them, as in selling diseased food or
poison, the policy of the law may, in order to stimulate proper care, require punishment of the
negligent person though he may be ignorant of the noxious character of what he sells." Id. at
252.
113. See ELIZABETH R. ALLGEIER & ALBERT R. ALLGEIER, SEXUAL INTERACTIONS at
334-36 (D.C. Heath and Co. 1984). The effectiveness of contraceptive methods, designed to
prevent conception and pregnancy, are measured by a theoretical and actual failure rate. The
actual failure rate refers to the number of conceptions resulting from a combination of method
failure and incorrect usage. The actual failure rate, out of 100 typical users, for birth control
pills is 2%; for diaphragms (with spermicide) is 10%; and for condoms it is 10%. Id.
114. The author of this Comment recognizes that in instances of forced sexual intercourse, such as rape, the act is not voluntary.
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ascertain whether she has or could have AIDS before engaging in an
act that may result in pregnancy, and rightly subject her to strict
liability for her failure to do so. 115 It is therefore conceivable that a
criminal law that restricts a woman's right to procreate, in order to
safeguard the health and safety of the unborn child as well as the
public, could pass the strict scrutiny test and withstand a constitutional challenge.
2. Freedom of Religion.-A second constitutional argument
against such legislation is that it burdens an individual's right to
freely practice religion. 116 A woman whose religious beliefs do not
permit the use of contraceptive measures to prevent pregnancy or
prohibit abortion of an unwanted or unplanned pregnancy would essentially be forced to choose between engaging in sexual relations at
the risk of breaking the law, refraining from sexual activity, or abandoning her religious values.1"
For example, the use of contraceptive devices has been forbidden by the Catholic church "since earliest times."'1 8 Pope Paul VI
declared that "direct interruption of the generative process . . . isto
be absolutely excluded . . . .similarly excluded is every action...
whether as an ends or a means, [that] render[s] procreation impossible." 1 1 9 While prohibited from preventing pregnancy by the employment of contraceptive devices, an HIV positive Catholic could choose
to abstain from marital sexual intercourse. 2 ' Moreover, an HIV-in115. See Shevlin-Carpenter Co., 218 U.S. at 69-70, and Balint, 258 U.S. at 252-53.
116. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or the free exercise thereof ....
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
117. The use of birth control or contraceptive devices is not permitted by members of
the Catholic Church. See JOHN HARDON, S.J.,MODERN CATHOLIC DICTIONARY at 129
(Doubleday & Co., Inc. 1980). All forms of birth control are also forbidden by the Amish
Community. See FRED L. ISREAL, MEET THE AMISH at 5 (Chelsea House Publishers 1986).
118. JOHN HARDON, S.J., MODERN CATHOLIC DICTIONARY at 129 (Doubleday & Co.,
Inc. 1980). The definition of contraception provides the "deliberate interference with marital
intercourse . . . .The Catholic Church has forbidden it since earliest times." Id.
119. Id. at 129-30 (quoting Pope Paul VI, HUMANAE VITAE at 14 (1968) in which it is
declared that "direct interruption of the generative process . . .is to be absolutely excluded
.... Similarly excluded is every action, that, either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in
its accomplishment, or in the development of its natural consequences, purposes, whether as an
ends or as a means, to render procreation impossible.").
120. See Hardon, supra note 118, at 129. Although the Catholic Church defines continence as "chastity to be observed by the unmarried," it also may "refer to abstinence, in
marriage, voluntarily agreed upon by both parties or forced by circumstances to abstain from
marital intercourse." Id. See also Gerald D. Coleman, S.S., Can A Person with AIDS Marry
in the Catholic Church, 49 JURIST 258 (1989), in which the author examined the theory that
AIDS prevents a Catholic couple from physically consummating or validating their marriage,
and pointed out that a marriage in which a decision is made to abstain from sexual intercourse
can be a valid marriage. Id. at 262-63. Such a decision "is not an impediment to marriage

CRIMINAL PREGNANCY

fected Catholic might be compelled to abstain from sexual relations
or risk the threat of criminal prosecution. A law that provides criminal sanctions for the transmission of a disease during pregnancy
would undoubtedly burden an individual's ability to freely engage in
marital intercourse without the use of contraception.
The criminal prosecution of an individual for the transmission
of a disease during pregnancy, however, would probably not be defeated by a freedom of religion objection. 12 ' The first amendment
provides two types of religious freedoms, the freedom to believe and
the freedom to act. 12 2 "The first is absolute, but in the nature of
things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation
for the protection of society."'2 3 When the exercise of religion involves behavior or conduct that endangers another person or presents
a threat to society, that state has a responsibility to regulate such
behavior. 24 As the Supreme Court has declared, "[t]he right to
practice religion freely does not include liberty to expose the community or the child to communicable diseases or the latter to ill health
or death."' 25 The interest of public health and safety in the prevention of infectious diseases has repeatedly been considered greater
than the individual's right to exercise religious beliefs. 2 6 Upholding
mandatory vaccination of school age children, regardless of religious
objections, a court in Arkansas stated that a "person's right to exhibit religious freedom ceases where it overlaps or transgresses the
rights of others." '
since it is not impossible to do so, only irresponsible." Id. at 263.
121. The Supreme Court has upheld restrictions on the freedom to exercise religion
when necessitated by greater social concerns. See infra note 126. See also Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1943) (holding a state law that prohibited minor
children from selling or distributing newspapers or pamphlets in the streets as permissible and
not a violation of the Jehovah Witnesses' right to practice their religion). But see Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (holding a state law that required a permit for solicitation
of religious contributions, and allowed a government official to determine if the cause was
indeed a religious one before issuing the permit, to be in violation of the constitution).
122. Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04.
123. Id.
124. See cases cited infra note 126. See also Childs v. Duckworth, 705 F.2d 915 (7th
Cir. 1983) (holding a prison inmate's first amendment right to exercise his religion was not
violated when prison officials refused to supply candles, incense, and a crystal ball because of
the valid security risk presented).
125. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-67.
126. See Cude v. State, 377 S.W.2d 816 (Ark. 1964) (finding a law requiring school
children to be vaccinated to be within the police power of the state, regardless of religious
objections); Brown v. Stone, 378 So.2d 218 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 887 (1980)
(finding the public health concern in requiring vaccination of school age children greater than
the right to exercise religious beliefs). See also Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)
(finding no violation of liberty in compulsory vaccination laws).
127. Cude, 377 S.W.2d at 819.
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The power of the state to burden the right to freely exercise
religion is not unlimited. 128 Again, strict scrutiny must be applied.
The purpose of the regulation must be the result of a compelling
state interest and it must not be so overly restrictive as to unduly
infringe the protected right. 29 A regulation that would essentially
force a woman to use birth control in order to prevent the prenatal
transmission of a deadly epidemic, despite religious beliefs against
such measures, would only burden a woman's right to act and not
her right to believe. 3 ' Although burdensome to the individual, such
a regulation would protect the child and society from a much greater
danger than the threat to the individual's personal right.
Thus, a state law prescribing criminal sanctions for the transfer
of AIDS/HIV during the prenatal transfer of blood and blood products could probably survive a constitutional attack. However, it
would still face many public policy and enforcement concerns.
B.

Problems and Concerns

The idea of using the criminal law to deter individuals infected
with AIDS/HIV from engaging in conduct responsible for the transmission of the disease is plagued with many dangers and disadvantages. 1' 1 Any state that chooses to utilize HIV criminalization statutes to prosecute HIV infected women who transfer the disease
during pregnancy must first address these problems and concerns.
1. Public Policy-ForcedAbortion and the Value of Human
Life.-The most alarming potential consequence of such a law is the
possibility that a woman who tests HIV positive during her pregnancy may be encouraged, through coercive counseling, to abort the
pregnancy. 3 ' Two health care facilities in Rhode Island that treat
128. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 304.
129. Id. "The power to regulate must be exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end,
unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Id.
130. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
131. See Hermann, supra note 48. Three main dangers or disadvantages are discussed:
1) decrease in the number of people seeking AIDS/HIV testing; 2) proof problems with causation and intent; and 3) selective enforcement. Id. at 356-57.
132. Arlene Zarembka & Katherine M. Franke, Women in the AIDS Epidemic: A Portrait of Unmet Needs, 9 ST. Louis UNIV. PUB. L. REV. 519, 524 (1990). The authors suggest
that
when infants born with HIV antibodies are called "the innocent victims," the
clear implication is that their mothers are in some way guilty or deserving of
their infection . . . . It is safe to predict that women will experience overwhelming punitive consequences of a positive test such as coerced abortions, sterilizations, loss of custodial rights, and functual quarantine.
Id. at 524.
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HIV positive women have already taken such a position.133 If the act
of transferring AIDS/HIV during pregnancy were criminalized,
abortion would become the only alternative available to an HIV positive woman who becomes pregnant, despite the use of birth control,
and does not want to risk criminal prosecution. Even if a woman
infected with AIDS/HIV wanted to abort her pregnancy, she might
experience difficulty finding a health care facility willing to perform
the procedure."' In addition, many poor women who may not be
able to afford an abortion will be left with no alternative to
prosecution.
Some states have explicitly declared public policies that favor
birth over abortion." 5 In those states, imposing strict liability for the
transmission of AIDS/HIV during pregnancy would directly contradict public policy. Specifically, Illinois has declared that
the unborn child is a human being from the time of conception
and is, therefore, a legal person for purposes of the child's right
to life

. ...

Further,

.

.

if those decisions of the United

States Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified or the
United States Constitution is amended to allow protection of the
unborn then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions
unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be
reinstated."3 6
Id. at 524, n.21 (citing Edward C. Maynard, M.D., HIV Infection in Pregnant
Rhode Island, 320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1626 (1989)).
See supra note 113.
Zarembka & Franke, supra note 132, at 525, n.25.
See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21 (Smith-Hurd 1991 Supp.) which provides:
It is the intention of the General Assembly of the State of Illinois to reasonably regulate abortion in conformance with the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court of January 22, 1973. Without in any way restricting the right of
privacy of a woman or the right of a woman to an abortion under those decisions, the General Assembly of the State of Illinois do solemnly declare and find
in reaffirmation of the longstanding policy of this State, that the unborn child
is a human being from the time of conception and is, therefore, a legal person
for purposes of the unborn child's right to life and is entitled to the right to life
from conception under the laws and Constitutions of this State. Further, the
General Assembly finds and declares that longstanding policy of this State to
protect the right to life of the unborn child from conception by prohibiting abortion unless necessary to preserve the life of the mother is impermissible only
because of the decisions of the United States Supreme Court and that, therefore,
if those decisions of the United States Supreme Court are ever reversed or modified or the United States Constitution is amended to allow protection of the
unborn then the former policy of this State to prohibit abortions unless necessary for the preservation of the mother's life shall be reinstated.
It is the further intention of the General Assembly to assure and protect the
woman's health and the integrity of the woman's decision whether or not to continue to bear a child, to protect the valid and compelling state interest in the
infant and unborn child, to assure the integrity of marital and familial relations
and the rights and interests of persons who participate in such relations, and to

133.
Women in
134.
135.
136.
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It is unlikely that Illinois will ever utilize its present HIV transmission statute to prosecute a woman who has AIDS/HIV and chooses
to give birth rather than abort her pregnancy, because to do so
would directly contradict this statement of legislative intent. 1 7 As
the Illinois Supreme Court declared in its refusal to allow recovery
for a claim of wrongful life, recognition of a fundamental right not
to be born with a disease would undermine the legislatively expressed policy favoring birth over abortion. 138
Moreover, we must not forget that when a child is born to an
infected mother the odds are in favor of the child being healthy. 13 9
Consequently, deterring women with AIDS/HIV from becoming
pregnant or coercing them to seek abortions could be considered an
extreme and unnecessary course of action.'" Furthermore, a woman
who is not infected with AIDS/HIV but who receives a false positive
test result 1 41 will be wrongly burdened in her right to choose whether
to bear a child. Proponents of the rights and needs of HIV positive
women have argued that the fact that so. many women choose to
take this 30% chance "reflects a much more complicated balancing
of considerations than that applied by so-called experts who consider
the issue as if HIV infection were the only factors in the
equation." 42
Finally, a position that favors aborting a pregnancy in which
there is a risk that the chid will be HIV-positive suggests that the
child will be irreparably harmed by being born HIV-positive, and
consequently would have been better off not being born. Such an
gather data for establishing criteria for medical decisions. The General Assembly finds as fact, upon hearings and public disclosures, that these rights and
interest are not secure in the economic and social context in which abortion is
presently performed. (emphasis added).
See also Mo. STAT. ANN. § 1.205.2, supra note 40.
137. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 81-21.
138. Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 512 N.E.2d 691, 701 (Ill. 1987). The
court reasoned that a finding that the child had an interest in avoiding his own birth would
require possession of "the divine ability to determine what defects should prevent an embryo
from being allowed life so that denial of the opportunity to terminate [the pregnancy] . . .
supports a cause of action." Id. at 698.
139. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
140. See Zarembka & Franke, supra note 132, at 525.
141. See Harvey V. Fineberg, Screening for HIV Infection and Public Health Policy,
18 LAW. MED. HEALTH CARE 29 (1990). "While under ideal conditions, a properly employed
battery of antibody tests is extremely accurate in terms of a very low risk of false positive
results, many laboratories do not attain such a level of quality." Id. at 31.
142. Zarembka & Franke, supra note 132, at 525. The authors disagree with a statement made by John Arras, a medical ethicist at Montefiore Hospital in Bronx, New York, that
society's interest in avoiding the cost of caring for babies with AIDS outweighs the judgment
of a woman that a 30% chance of having an HIV infected child is a risk worth taking. Id. at
525, n.24.
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argument "suggests that there is a perspective apart from our life
and world, from which one can stand and say that he finds nonexistence preferable to existence."14' 3 Many courts, in refusing to allow wrongful life and wrongful birth actions,"" have already demonstrated a reluctance to recognize as an injury the condition of being
born alive with a congenital or genetic impairment. 4 5 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court so aptly noted,
[b]ecause we have no way of knowing what opportunity will be
available to this child or how the child will respond to life in
general, we cannot say how the child's pain and suffering will
compare to the benefits of its life, and thus, we cannot determine
that its life constitutes an injury. 4"
2. Enforcement and Deterrence.-Practicalityof enforcement
and the realistic probability of any deterrent effect must also be considered. Because "[e]very person convicted of a criminal offense has
demonstrated a willingness to violate a legal proscription,"' "1 7 it may
not be effective to use the criminal law as a deterrent to transmission
of AIDS/HIV. It is realistic to theorize that a person who is already
facing a death sentence" will not be deterred by the threat of criminal prosecution from taking the 70% chance to beget a healthy
child."19 Furthermore, use of the criminal law may even be inequitable because it requires individuals to behave at the highest stages of
moral development, and it has been suggested that many AIDS/
50
HIV carriers may not have the ability or willingness to do so.'
In addition, the threat of criminal sanctions may act as a disincentive to seeking early diagnosis and treatment.15 ' If knowledge of
HIV infection is necessary to criminally transfer the disease, it is
logical that the attitude "what I don't know can't hurt me" may
143. Goldberg v. Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406, 409 (I11.1986) (refusing to allow recovery for
child born with tay-sachs disease under a theory of wrongful life).
144. See Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, 512 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. 1987). Wrongful birth actions are brought by the parents in their own behalf and wrongful life actions are
brought on behalf of the child. Id.
145. See Black v. Cruz, 698 P.2d 315 (Idaho 1984) (congenital rubella); Goldberg v.
Ruskin, 499 N.E.2d 406 (Il1. 1986) (tay-sachs disease); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 718 P.2d 635
(Kan. 1986) (down's syndrome).
146. Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d 1327, 1329 (Pa. 1986) (holding that a child born with
virulent form of neurofibromatosis did not have a cause of action for wrongful life).
147. Hermann, supra note 48, at 355.
148. See Closen & Deutchmann, supra note 71, at 593-94.
149. See supra note 31.
150. Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS and Contemporary State Powers: Public
Health and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1044 (1989).
151. See Hermann, supra note 48, at 356-57.
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prevail. It is possible, however, that appreciation of the benefits of
early treatment which directly results from early diagnosis might
152
minimize this effect.
Finally, there is a possibility of selective enforcement since those
individuals who must rely on government medical assistance will be
brought to the attention of prosecuting authorities more easily than
those who can afford to obtain private health care. 153
V.

Conclusion and Recommendation

The seriousness of the AIDS/HIV epidemic is undisputed. It is
a danger that threatens all Americans.154 As Representative Jose E.
Serrano reminded the. House of Representatives shortly after the
Persian Gulf War, "we must not forget that we have another kind of
war right here in our own backyard . . . a war that is killing hundreds of people in their prime of life - even worse, those who may
never have a chance - our children.115 5 Responding to a recommendation from the Presidential Commission,' 5" several state legislatures
have employed the criminal law as the latest weapon in the battle
against this deadly epidemic. 57 However, taking these criminal laws
one step further and using them to prosecute women who transfer
AIDS/HIV during the prenatal period would most likely prove to be
an ineffective and overly burdensome measure.
Instead, a more effective means of preventing prenatal transmission may be appropriate contraceptive counseling and AIDS/HIV
education. The basic premise of counseling and training services is
"knowing your HIV serostatus and receiving appropriate counseling
can lead to behavior changes which reduce transmission of HIV."' 158
Such an approach offers promise. A recent survey of more than fifty
studies showed that the counseling did lead to behavior changes in
59
some people.
Currently, HIV counseling and screening services are the key
152. See Hermann, supra note 48, at 356-57.
153. The Constitutional Rights of AIDS Carriers,supra note 108, at 1284. See also
Hermann, supra note 48, at 357.
154. THE REPORT, supra note 3, at XVII.
155. Perspective: Children and AIDS, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION (Center for Disease
Control, Atlanta, GA, Special Report, July 1991) at 1. Representative Serrano introduced a
resolution for a "Pediatric AIDS Awareness Week." Id.
156. See THE REPORT, supra note 3.
157. See statutes supra note 9.
158. Counseling and Testing: Effective Prevention Services, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION
(Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, GA, February 1991) at 7.
159. Id. at 8.
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elements of this country's HIV.preventional strategy.1 ° There are at
least ninety-eight community based organizations, in metropolitan
areas most affected by AIDS, that are directly funded by the Center
for Disease Control and encouraged to address the needs of reproductive age women." 1 Many other counseling and education programs sponsored by the American Red Cross target women in high
risk groups."" The objectives of these preventative programs are: 1)
identifying and removing barriers to effective use of contraception
among women in high risk groups or already infected; 2) facilitating
the use of family planning services; 3) evaluating psychosocial factors related to the use of contraception; and 4) encouraging behavior
modification to reduce acquisition and transmission of AIDS/
63
HIV.1
The possibility of transferring AIDS/HIV to an unborn child is
already a concern to many women who seek information from the
Center for Disease Control. 6 In order to encourage these women to
make responsible and informed decisions, efforts should be increased
to facilitate contraceptive counseling and AIDS/HIV education. Despite the compelling and valid interest of the state in protecting the
public from the spread of this deadly epidemic, and irrespective of
the likelihood that such criminal prosecution could withstand a constitutional challenge, a woman should not be forced to choose between aborting a potentially healthy fetus or risking violation of a
criminal law. Rather, a woman should be encouraged to make an
informed and caring decision before she becomes pregnant and
"cling[s] to the new life growing inside her . ... 5
Deborah A. Wieczorkowski Wanamaker

160. Targeting Prevention Programs to Women via Community Based Organizations,
HIV/AIDS PREVENTION (Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, GA, Newsletter, April 1991)
at 11.
161. Id.
162. Activities and Outreach of the American Red Cross, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION
(Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, GA, Newsletter, April 1991) at 12.
163. Perinatal HIV Preventative Projects Evaluate Strategies, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION
(Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, GA, February 1991) at 12.
164. Women and AIDS: Resources and Services, HIV/AIDS PREVENTION (Center for
Disease Control, Atlanta, GA, Newsletter, April 1991) at 7. The Center for Disease Control
reported that 43% of its one million calls in 1990 were from women and one of the most
common questions was "I am thinking of becoming pregnant. Should I be tested for HIV?"
Id.
165. Peterson, supra note 1.

